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OCT 31 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Organisation of Intelligence Activities in the Government

Within the past few months, with your approval, a number of steps have been taken to readjust the Government's intelligence activities to a post-war basis and to establish within the normal framework of the Government an effective intelligence operation. These steps have been consistent with a plan for the post-war organization of intelligence which has resulted from several years of study by staff of the Bureau of the Budget. The basic elements of that plan have been discussed with you and were set forth briefly in the manorands transmitting the recommendations of Hr. Snyder, Judge Roseman, and myself on the disposition of the Office of Strategic Services which you approved through Executive Order No. 9621 of September 20.

Attached is our complete report of recommendations in this field.

This memorandum summerises the recommendations of the report and progress made to date.

A Basis for the Post-war Organization of Intelligence

It is commonly accepted that, despite a continuous improvement during the war and nome individual instances of successful performance, total performance in intelligence has not been on a par with that of some other nations. My staff has endeavored to determine the administrative reasons for this in order that we might learn from the mistakes of the past in building for the future.

Attached to this memorandum is a report resulting from our studies. It reviews the Government's prewar and wartime intelligence activities and develops conclusions and recommendations. For your convenience, there follows a summary of the principal findings and conclusions of the report.

Summary of findings. The principal weakness has been the inadequacy of the intelligence operations of the departments concerned, indeed the lack of any intelligence operation in the State Department. Inadequate operations have resulted in failure to anticipate intelligence needs, in failure to recognise trends, in lack of perspective, and in inadequate pooling of intelligence except on the basis of mutual exchange of individual reports.

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Before the war, and to a considerable extent still, there has been an overaphesis on security intelligence, i.e., intelligence which is conserved with unfriendly or "dangerous" individuals either at home or abread. The overaphesis on this kind of intelligence was largely responsible for our failure to develop early enough the type of organization necessary to produce really basis intelligence. Further, the continued placement of the security intelligence operation within the same units responsible for more basis intelligence has caused many of our estimates to be overweighted with security considerations and has caused us too often to be on guard against the least of our dangers.

Our wartime expansion was not in accord with any prior plan, nor was there any machinery through which coordination could be achieved. The freedom of funds enjoyed by the departments during the war has not been conductive to the development of a Government-wide integrated program nor has much landership toward this end been possible during the war because of the fear of interrupting a vital service. Such attempts as have been made, including those undertaken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have resulted in ad hoe arrangements to further occupantion rather than to secure real coordination.

Throughout all of our study the newness of intelligence as an operation on smything approaching its present scale was apparent. There still is a widespread minundarstanding of what intelligence is, how it is produced, and in what way it relates to and serves the action and policy-making people. For example, many persons whose active participation in developing an effective post-way operation is essential are still thinking narrowly in terms of spice and intrigue, in terms of current developments and the latest news, or in terms, solely, of the development of new or special sources of information.

Summer of conclusions. The report develops, from an analysis of these weaknesses, four major conclusions and two of secondary importance which are in effect the elements of a plan for post-war organisation.

- Our expanded requirements for intelligence will require more widespread understanding among Government officials and agencies of what intelligence is and how it is produced, and a more widespread participation in the development and implementation of plans for improved operation.
- 2. The principal intelligence operations of the Government should be organized at the point where decision is made or action taken, i.e., at the departmental, or lower, level and not within any single central agency. Each department (or subdivision of a department) which has important responsibilities in international matters or which has



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responsibilities for providing the public with information about foreign countries should provide for a competent foreign intelligence operation.

- 3. The basic intelligence operation in each department should be organised apart from the security or "counter" intelligence operation serving internal security purposes, except for the untual exchange of highly summarised and significant intelligence.
- 4. To ensure optimum results from the departmental intelligence and security operations, however, integrated Government-wide programs should be developed under the leadership of the State Department, through the creation of two interdepartmental committees, one dealing with basic intelligence in general (political, economic, military, sociological, geographic, etc.) and the other with security and security intelligence.

Of a less pressing and longer-range nature are the following two conclusions:

- 5. Some high-level intelligence is needed to guide decisions made at a level above the departments themselves. The State Department should serve as the principal agency for the development or procurement of such intelligence. The President, however, may find necessary an independent research staff to serve his own needs. Should this be found desirable, the research staff should be small and be concerned primarily with bringing together intelligence available in all departments to fulfill a particular need.
- 6. There may be some need to centralize under the direction of the interdepartmental groups organised under the leadership of the Secretary of State certain operations which are common to all agencies or which for policy reasons may best be purformed centrally. The determination of the kind of central operation which will be needed can await study by the central coordinating body provided for in 4, shows. In general, however, no operation should be undertaken centrally which can be performed estisfactorily at the departmental level.

Progress in Readjusting to Post-war Organization

The principal steps already taken toward achieving a post-war organisation based on the conclusions outlined above are the following:



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- 1. Of greatest importance is strengthening our intelligence for the pest-mar period, and consistent with the conclusions that the principal intelligence operations of the Government should be confusted within the departments rather than in a control agency, was the establishment of an Office of Research and Intelligence in the State Department. The importance of this step was stressed in the Bureau of the Budget's report to Socretary Byrmes of last summer. On September 25 the Department announced the appaintment of Colonal Alfred McGermack as Special Assistant to the Socretary in charge of Research and Intelligence.
- .2. On September 20, through Ementive Order No. 9621, the Research and Analysis Branch and related non-elandertine activities of the Office of Strategic Services were transferred (effective October 1) to an Interia Research and Intelligence Service reporting to Colonel McCormack in the State Department. The State Department is currently preparing a supplemental indept for the absorption of the Interia Service, after considerable readjustment and curtailment, into the permenent Department. The Office in the State Department was thus provided with a going and competent research shaff.
- 3. A small part of the Foreign Resonate Administration will be transferred to the State Department in accordance with Executive Order No. 9630 of September 27. The Bureau of the Budget is currently working with the State Department in preparing for absorption of the transferred activities.
- 4. On September 20, coincident with the public someoment of the CSS transfer, you directed Secretary Byrnes to assume the leadership in developing an integrated Government-wide intelligence program through the creation of interdepartmental committees to coordinate the intelligence operations within the various departments. The immediate problems of building his own facilities and of assembling a staff have delayed action on this matter. Staff of the Bureau of the Budget is correctly working with the State Department to assist in organizing these groups and in developing an orderly procedure.

Stene Correctly Being Planned

The desirability of effecting a separation of security and security intelligence from basis intelligence will necessitate the organization of two committees in the State Department. It is possible that the State Department will request your approval of an additional directive to the departments concerned to clarify the exact responsibilities placed on the Secretary of State in your previous public letter.

The necessity to secure a more widespress understanding of intelligence and of the principles on which a strong post-war organisation should be based, not only among Government officials but in the Congress, in still a parament problem. During the current period of transition from wartime to post-war operation, it has been difficult to accomplish as much as in desirable toward this objective because of the variety of suggestions for post-war organisation currently being considered and advocated. The latters which you made public to Secretary Byznes and General Donovan have apparently not yet made it sufficiently clear that we are not going back to our pro-1939 minution but sure moving in accordance with a plan to develop a more effective program for the future. Within the limitations of available staff, the Bureau of the Suiget has endeavered to keep in constant touch with planning now under way in the various departments. The interdepartmental groups which will be brought together under the State Department will accomplish a great deal. Meanwhile, however, the Bureau of the Suiget will intensify its activities. Among other things, we intend to give appropriate distribution to the attached report.

Action Recommended

With your approval, the specific additional proposals which I shall recommend from time to time relating to the organization of intelligence and security sativities will conform to the general plan outlined in this memorandum and in the attached report.

(Signed) HARULD D. SMITH

Director

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
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Socretarial services provided by the Socretarial
Members of the sub-committees designated by all departments of interest, either as users
or producers, in the subject or kind of operation with which the sub-committee is
concerned. Departmental participation will be as determined upon, and on the invitation of,
the appropriate Committee.

Chairmen provided from the Secretariat

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Functional Organization Chart INTERDEPARTMENTAL COORDINATING COMMITTEES INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY

INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING COMMITTEE INTERDEPARTMENTAL SECURITY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

Establish operating plans in readiness for future use to meet changing conditions Promutgate specific operating plans for the comment of the Government's inhelligence and security activities to insure that Establish criteria and policies for the organization of the Government's intelligence and security activities resources within or without the Corernment and that any unnecessary overlap or duplication is esiminated they fulfill all national requirements including those of any department; that they utilize to the fullest all mulicibia

SECRETARIAT

SUB-COMMITTEES IN VARIOUS SUBJECTS OR KINDS OF OPERATION AS DETERMINED BY THE APPROPRIATE COMMITTEE Present recommendations and plans to the committees for decision Man the Committees programs and serve as the executive carrying them out daintain the document files including all correspondence, agendas, minutes, study sheeks, decisions, directives, rovide the Committees and sub-committes with secretarial service kerelap the accument procedure and all other procedures of the committeesor sub-committees litect and coordinate the activities of the sub-committees and serve as their chairmen operating plans and manuals

Ithin the assigned subject or kind of operation assigned

Determine the means, in terms of actual operations for fulfilling those requirements

Develop a detailed statement in compiled and indexed form of the national requirements including those of any department of inforest

Berelop, for submission to the appropriate Committee, proposed plans, legislation and other instruments for the adjustment of operations in Perchap, for submission to the appropriate Committee, proposed specific operating plans the event of emergency or other changed conditions

Serve as a continuing group responsible for developing a coordinated program for severing its adequary and economy of operation

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